

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REFERENCE SLIP

DATE ~~OCT 1~~ 1970  
9/25/70

TO:	Name or Title	Organ. Symbol	Room No.	Bldg.	Initials	Date
1.	Dr. J. Lederberg	Stanford U.				
2.	Genetics Dept.	Stanford, Calif.				
3.						
4.						
5.						

Approval	Initial for Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	Necessary Action	Prepare Reply
Comment	Note and Forward	See Me
For Your Information	Note and Return	Signature

REMARKS OR ADDITIONAL ROUTING

Dear Joshua:

Enclosed, as you requested, is a copy of the resolution adopted at the Xth International Congress on Microbiology at Mexico City.

Your time report form (for your consultant fee) has been passed on for action and I trust that you will receive payment shortly.

Sincerely,



Enclosure:  
As stated

FROM: (Name and Org. Symbol)	ROOM NO. & BLDG.	PHONE NO.
ACDA/IR - Arthur Day	4495 NS	

MEXICO D.F. X<sup>th</sup> CONGRESS  
INTERNATIONAL MICROBIOLOGY

Participants in conference on biological warfare present the attached document to the Officers and National Delegates to the Assembly of the International Association of Microbiological Societies (IAMS), with the recommendation that it be approved at a plenary session of the X International Congress for Microbiology.

We ask that this document be submitted to the International Union of Biological Sciences (IUBS) and to the Continuing Committee of the Pugwash movement with a request that supplementary actions be taken because many of the current biological weapons have emerged since the adoption by acclamation at the Plenary Session of the IV International Congress of Microbiology (Copenhagen, July 26, 1947) of the following resolution:

"The Fourth International Congress of microbiology joins the International Society of Cell Biology in condemning in the strongest possible terms all forms of biological warfare. The Congress considers such barbaric methods as absolutely unworthy of any civilized community and trusts that all microbiologists throughout the world will do everything in their power to prevent their exploitation."

Specifically the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) might consider having its Committee on Social Impact of Science assume a union function with regard to Associations for the Advancement of Science, Societies for the Social Responsibility in Science, etc. A desirable input of competence from the social sciences would thus be assured and a logical point of contact would be established also for any professional ethics chapters that might be formed in the future. We suggest further that the ICSU Committee should as soon as possible ask UNESCO to organize an International Conference on Ethics in Science and the Protection of Scientific Manpower.

Finally the conference on biological warfare feels that the President of IAMS should present the attached document to the UN disarmament conference in Geneva, to the Secretary General of the United Nations and to Governments throughout the world.

## RESOLUTION

The microbiologists taking part in the conference on biological warfare at the X International Congress for Microbiology in Mexico, 7-14 August 1970, have studied and discussed in detail much material including:

1. Report of the UN Secretary-General (1969).

Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use.

2. Report of a WHO Group of Consultants (1970).

Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons.

3. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (1970). The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare.

Provisional Edition. Parts I, III, IV.

THEREFORE THEY ARE COGNIZANT of the great potential dangers of human, animal, and plant infections to the welfare of mankind;

KNOW what grave consequences could result from the use of harmful micro-organisms (bacteria, fungi and viruses) or their products as instruments of warfare;

DECLARE that microbiological methods of warfare should not be employed, even in retaliation;

BELIEVE also that no country should produce, sell or acquire microbial agents in quantity, except for peaceful purposes or to improve the health and well-being of mankind;

CONVINCED also that: (i) the search for truth in science is enhanced by nonsecret research, and that secret research tends to increase mistrust and international tension; (ii) the results of scientific investigation should be published and widely disseminated, and (iii) the free movement of scientists from one laboratory or one country to another is an important aspect of science;

REALIZING that the pursuit of these aims is shared by the vast majority of Mankind as indicated by:

- a. the fact that a majority of UN member states have already signed and ratified The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, (Geneva, on June 17, 1925).

- b. The scope of the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 2162 (XXI) of 5 December 1966, and 2454 (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, which called for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol;
- c. the trend among nations to go beyond the provision of the Geneva Protocol, for instance by unilateral renunciation of use under any circumstances of biological weapons and of any further research and development of such weapons;
- d. the fact that several nations have by treaty renounced the use of weapons of mass destruction;
- e. the resolutions passed by many professional societies and congresses (appended).

AFFIRM, SUPPORT AND WELCOME further positive activities of the same kind, and particularly

WE URGE THAT:

- a. all countries that have not signed or ratified the Geneva Protocol should do so, and
- b. all installations (laboratories, academies, institutes, etc.) where established microbiological programs have been carried out expressly for offensive or defensive biological warfare purposes be converted to peaceful uses, if possible with international participation, and that no new installations should be commissioned.
- c. all stockpiles of biological weapons should be destroyed as soon as possible.

WE BELIEVE THAT existing installations for military microbiology could usefully be converted to any of the following uses:

Applied environmental microbiology  
 Biogeochemical transformations  
 Conservation of soils  
 Crop productivity and biological nitrogen fixation  
 Production of proteins and other food substances  
 Production of enzymes and hormones  
 Purification and recycling of sewage for drinking water  
 Rapid diagnosis of infectious diseases  
 Improved means of mass-vaccination

Problems of viral carcinogenesis  
Problems of molecular biology  
Microbiological pest control  
etc.

Although microbiology is our field of competence, we feel that similar principles could usefully be applied as well to chemical, atomic, and other means of mass destruction.

We recommend the use of arbitration in the solution of problems connected with matters related to this resolution.